{"schema_version":"1.7.2","id":"OESA-2021-1161","modified":"2021-05-06T11:02:51Z","published":"2021-05-06T11:02:51Z","upstream":["CVE-2021-21295","CVE-2021-21409"],"summary":"netty security update","details":"Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers \u0026amp; clients. %package    help Summary:          Documents for %{name} Buildarch:        noarch Requires:         man info Provides:         %{name}-javadoc = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes:        %{name}-javadoc \u0026lt; %{version}-%{release} %description help Man pages and other related documents for %{name}.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nNetty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers \u0026amp; clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel\u0026apos;s pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is True: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.(CVE-2021-21295)\r\n\r\nNetty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers \u0026amp; clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.61.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. The content-length header is not correctly validated if the request only uses a single Http2HeaderFrame with the endStream set to to True. This could lead to request smuggling if the request is proxied to a remote peer and translated to HTTP/1.1. This is a followup of GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj/CVE-2021-21295 which did miss to fix this one case. This was fixed as part of 4.1.61.Final.(CVE-2021-21409)","affected":[{"package":{"ecosystem":"openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP1","name":"netty","purl":"pkg:rpm/openEuler/netty\u0026distro=openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.1.13-11.oe1"}]}],"ecosystem_specific":{"aarch64":["netty-4.1.13-11.oe1.aarch64.rpm"],"noarch":["netty-help-4.1.13-11.oe1.noarch.rpm"],"src":["netty-4.1.13-11.oe1.src.rpm"],"x86_64":["netty-4.1.13-11.oe1.x86_64.rpm"]}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://openeuler.org/en/security/safety-bulletin/detail.html?id=openEuler-SA-2021-1161"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21295"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21409"}],"database_specific":{"severity":"Medium"}}