{"schema_version":"1.7.2","id":"OESA-2024-2030","modified":"2024-08-23T11:08:54Z","published":"2024-08-23T11:08:54Z","upstream":["CVE-2021-47207","CVE-2024-26586","CVE-2024-26598","CVE-2024-26602","CVE-2024-27013","CVE-2024-36286","CVE-2024-36484","CVE-2024-36904","CVE-2024-36914","CVE-2024-36933","CVE-2024-38565","CVE-2024-38597","CVE-2024-39276","CVE-2024-42070","CVE-2024-42229","CVE-2024-42232","CVE-2024-42236","CVE-2024-42304","CVE-2024-42310","CVE-2024-43839"],"summary":"kernel security update","details":"The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nALSA: gus: fix null pointer dereference on pointer block\r\n\r\nThe pointer block return from snd_gf1_dma_next_block could be\nnull, so there is a potential null pointer dereference issue.\nFix this by adding a null check before dereference.(CVE-2021-47207)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nmlxsw: spectrum_acl_tcam: Fix stack corruption\r\n\r\nWhen tc filters are first added to a net device, the corresponding local\nport gets bound to an ACL group in the device. The group contains a list\nof ACLs. In turn, each ACL points to a different TCAM region where the\nfilters are stored. During forwarding, the ACLs are sequentially\nevaluated until a match is found.\r\n\r\nOne reason to place filters in different regions is when they are added\nwith decreasing priorities and in an alternating order so that two\nconsecutive filters can never fit in the same region because of their\nkey usage.\r\n\r\nIn Spectrum-2 and newer ASICs the firmware started to report that the\nmaximum number of ACLs in a group is more than 16, but the layout of the\nregister that configures ACL groups (PAGT) was not updated to account\nfor that. It is therefore possible to hit stack corruption [1] in the\nrare case where more than 16 ACLs in a group are required.\r\n\r\nFix by limiting the maximum ACL group size to the minimum between what\nthe firmware reports and the maximum ACLs that fit in the PAGT register.\r\n\r\nAdd a test case to make sure the machine does not crash when this\ncondition is hit.\r\n\r\n[1]\nKernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_group_update+0x116/0x120\n[...]\n dump_stack_lvl+0x36/0x50\n panic+0x305/0x330\n __stack_chk_fail+0x15/0x20\n mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_group_update+0x116/0x120\n mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_group_region_attach+0x69/0x110\n mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_vchunk_get+0x492/0xa20\n mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_ventry_add+0x25/0xe0\n mlxsw_sp_acl_rule_add+0x47/0x240\n mlxsw_sp_flower_replace+0x1a9/0x1d0\n tc_setup_cb_add+0xdc/0x1c0\n fl_hw_replace_filter+0x146/0x1f0\n fl_change+0xc17/0x1360\n tc_new_tfilter+0x472/0xb90\n rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x313/0x3b0\n netlink_rcv_skb+0x58/0x100\n netlink_unicast+0x244/0x390\n netlink_sendmsg+0x1e4/0x440\n ____sys_sendmsg+0x164/0x260\n ___sys_sendmsg+0x9a/0xe0\n __sys_sendmsg+0x7a/0xc0\n do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b(CVE-2024-26586)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nKVM: arm64: vgic-its: Avoid potential UAF in LPI translation cache\r\n\r\nThere is a potential UAF scenario in the case of an LPI translation\ncache hit racing with an operation that invalidates the cache, such\nas a DISCARD ITS command. The root of the problem is that\nvgic_its_check_cache() does not elevate the refcount on the vgic_irq\nbefore dropping the lock that serializes refcount changes.\r\n\r\nHave vgic_its_check_cache() raise the refcount on the returned vgic_irq\nand add the corresponding decrement after queueing the interrupt.(CVE-2024-26598)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nsched/membarrier: reduce the ability to hammer on sys_membarrier\r\n\r\nOn some systems, sys_membarrier can be very expensive, causing overall\nslowdowns for everything.  So put a lock on the path in order to\nserialize the accesses to prevent the ability for this to be called at\ntoo high of a frequency and saturate the machine.(CVE-2024-26602)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ntun: limit printing rate when illegal packet received by tun dev\r\n\r\nvhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many\nillegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents.\nWhen console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump\npacket and soft lockup will be detected.\r\n\r\nnet_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate.\r\n\r\nPID: 33036    TASK: ffff949da6f20000  CPU: 23   COMMAND: \u0026quot;vhost-32980\u0026quot;\n #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253\n #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3\n #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e\n #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d\n #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663\n    [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20]\n    RIP: ffffffff89792594  RSP: ffffa655314979e8  RFLAGS: 00000002\n    RAX: ffffffff89792500  RBX: ffffffff8af428a0  RCX: 0000000000000000\n    RDX: 00000000000003fd  RSI: 0000000000000005  RDI: ffffffff8af428a0\n    RBP: 0000000000002710   R8: 0000000000000004   R9: 000000000000000f\n    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: ffffffff8acbf64f  R12: 0000000000000020\n    R13: ffffffff8acbf698  R14: 0000000000000058  R15: 0000000000000000\n    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018\n #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594\n #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470\n #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6\n #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605\n #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558\n #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124\n #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07\n #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306\n #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765\n #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun]\n #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun]\n #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net]\n #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost]\n #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72\n #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f(CVE-2024-27013)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnetfilter: nfnetlink_queue: acquire rcu_read_lock() in instance_destroy_rcu()\r\n\r\nsyzbot reported that nf_reinject() could be called without rcu_read_lock() :\r\n\r\nWARNING: suspicious RCU usage\n6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02060-g5c1672705a1a #0 Not tainted\r\n\r\nnet/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:263 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!\r\n\r\nother info that might help us debug this:\r\n\r\nrcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1\n2 locks held by syz-executor.4/13427:\n  #0: ffffffff8e334f60 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:329 [inline]\n  #0: ffffffff8e334f60 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2190 [inline]\n  #0: ffffffff8e334f60 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_core+0xa86/0x1830 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2471\n  #1: ffff88801ca92958 (\u0026amp;inst-\u0026gt;lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]\n  #1: ffff88801ca92958 (\u0026amp;inst-\u0026gt;lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: nfqnl_flush net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:405 [inline]\n  #1: ffff88801ca92958 (\u0026amp;inst-\u0026gt;lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: instance_destroy_rcu+0x30/0x220 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:172\r\n\r\nstack backtrace:\nCPU: 0 PID: 13427 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02060-g5c1672705a1a #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;IRQ\u0026gt;\n  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]\n  dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114\n  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x221/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6712\n  nf_reinject net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:323 [inline]\n  nfqnl_reinject+0x6ec/0x1120 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:397\n  nfqnl_flush net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:410 [inline]\n  instance_destroy_rcu+0x1ae/0x220 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:172\n  rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2196 [inline]\n  rcu_core+0xafd/0x1830 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2471\n  handle_softirqs+0x2d6/0x990 kernel/softirq.c:554\n  __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:588 [inline]\n  invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:428 [inline]\n  __irq_exit_rcu+0xf4/0x1c0 kernel/softirq.c:637\n  irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:649\n  instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 [inline]\n  sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043\n \u0026lt;/IRQ\u0026gt;\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;(CVE-2024-36286)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnet: relax socket state check at accept time.\r\n\r\nChristoph reported the following splat:\r\n\r\nWARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 772 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:761 __inet_accept+0x1f4/0x4a0\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 1 PID: 772 Comm: syz-executor510 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-g7da7119fe22b #56\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:__inet_accept+0x1f4/0x4a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:759\nCode: 04 38 84 c0 0f 85 87 00 00 00 41 c7 04 24 03 00 00 00 48 83 c4 10 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc e8 ec b7 da fd \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b e9 7f fe ff ff e8 e0 b7 da fd 0f 0b e9 fe fe ff ff 89 d9 80\nRSP: 0018:ffffc90000c2fc58 EFLAGS: 00010293\nRAX: ffffffff836bdd14 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff888104668000\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000\nRBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffffff836bdb89 R09: fffff52000185f64\nR10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff52000185f64 R12: dffffc0000000000\nR13: 1ffff92000185f98 R14: ffff88810754d880 R15: ffff8881007b7800\nFS:  000000001c772880(0000) GS:ffff88811b280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007fb9fcf2e178 CR3: 00000001045d2002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nPKRU: 55555554\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n inet_accept+0x138/0x1d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:786\n do_accept+0x435/0x620 net/socket.c:1929\n __sys_accept4_file net/socket.c:1969 [inline]\n __sys_accept4+0x9b/0x110 net/socket.c:1999\n __do_sys_accept net/socket.c:2016 [inline]\n __se_sys_accept net/socket.c:2013 [inline]\n __x64_sys_accept+0x7d/0x90 net/socket.c:2013\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x58/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\nRIP: 0033:0x4315f9\nCode: fd ff 48 81 c4 80 00 00 00 e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 ab b4 fd ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00\nRSP: 002b:00007ffdb26d9c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002b\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000400300 RCX: 00000000004315f9\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000004\nRBP: 00000000006e1018 R08: 0000000000400300 R09: 0000000000400300\nR10: 0000000000400300 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000\nR13: 000000000040cdf0 R14: 000000000040ce80 R15: 0000000000000055\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;\r\n\r\nThe reproducer invokes shutdown() before entering the listener status.\nAfter commit 94062790aedb (\u0026quot;tcp: defer shutdown(SEND_SHUTDOWN) for\nTCP_SYN_RECV sockets\u0026quot;), the above causes the child to reach the accept\nsyscall in FIN_WAIT1 status.\r\n\r\nEric noted we can relax the existing assertion in __inet_accept()(CVE-2024-36484)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ntcp: Use refcount_inc_not_zero() in tcp_twsk_unique().\r\n\r\nAnderson Nascimento reported a use-after-free splat in tcp_twsk_unique()\nwith nice analysis.\r\n\r\nSince commit ec94c2696f0b (\u0026quot;tcp/dccp: avoid one atomic operation for\ntimewait hashdance\u0026quot;), inet_twsk_hashdance() sets TIME-WAIT socket\u0026apos;s\nsk_refcnt after putting it into ehash and releasing the bucket lock.\r\n\r\nThus, there is a small race window where other threads could try to\nreuse the port during connect() and call sock_hold() in tcp_twsk_unique()\nfor the TIME-WAIT socket with zero refcnt.\r\n\r\nIf that happens, the refcnt taken by tcp_twsk_unique() is overwritten\nand sock_put() will cause underflow, triggering a real use-after-free\nsomewhere else.\r\n\r\nTo avoid the use-after-free, we need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() in\ntcp_twsk_unique() and give up on reusing the port if it returns false.\r\n\r\n[0]:\nrefcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1039313 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110\nCPU: 0 PID: 1039313 Comm: trigger Not tainted 6.8.6-200.fc39.x86_64 #1\nHardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.B64.2305221830 05/22/2023\nRIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110\nCode: 42 8e ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d aa 13 ea 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 f8 8e b7 82 c6 05 96 13 ea 01 01 e8 7b 42 8e ff \u0026lt;0f\u0026gt; 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 50 8f b7 82 c6 05 7a 13 ea 01 01 e8\nRSP: 0018:ffffc90006b43b60 EFLAGS: 00010282\nRAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888009bb3ef0 RCX: 0000000000000027\nRDX: ffff88807be218c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88807be218c0\nRBP: 0000000000069d70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90006b439f0\nR10: ffffc90006b439e8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880029ede84\nR13: 0000000000004e20 R14: ffffffff84356dc0 R15: ffff888009bb3ef0\nFS:  00007f62c10926c0(0000) GS:ffff88807be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 0000000020ccb000 CR3: 000000004628c005 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0\nPKRU: 55555554\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110\n ? __warn+0x81/0x130\n ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110\n ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0\n ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110\n ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80\n ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70\n ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20\n ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xe5/0x110\n tcp_twsk_unique+0x186/0x190\n __inet_check_established+0x176/0x2d0\n __inet_hash_connect+0x74/0x7d0\n ? __pfx___inet_check_established+0x10/0x10\n tcp_v4_connect+0x278/0x530\n __inet_stream_connect+0x10f/0x3d0\n inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60\n __sys_connect+0xa8/0xd0\n __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20\n do_syscall_64+0x83/0x170\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80\nRIP: 0033:0x7f62c11a885d\nCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 \u0026lt;48\u0026gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a3 45 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48\nRSP: 002b:00007f62c1091e58 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020ccb004 RCX: 00007f62c11a885d\nRDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020ccb000 RDI: 0000000000000003\nRBP: 00007f62c1091e90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 00007f62c10926c0\nR13: ffffffffffffff88 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffe237885b0\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;(CVE-2024-36904)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrm/amd/display: Skip on writeback when it\u0026apos;s not applicable\r\n\r\n[WHY]\ndynamic memory safety error detector (KASAN) catches and generates error\nmessages \u0026quot;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds\u0026quot; as writeback connector does not\nsupport certain features which are not initialized.\r\n\r\n[HOW]\nSkip them when connector type is DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_WRITEBACK.(CVE-2024-36914)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnsh: Restore skb-\u0026gt;{protocol,data,mac_header} for outer header in nsh_gso_segment().\r\n\r\nsyzbot triggered various splats (see [0] and links) by a crafted GSO\npacket of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP layering the following protocols:\r\n\r\n  ETH_P_8021AD + ETH_P_NSH + ETH_P_IPV6 + IPPROTO_UDP\r\n\r\nNSH can encapsulate IPv4, IPv6, Ethernet, NSH, and MPLS.  As the inner\nprotocol can be Ethernet, NSH GSO handler, nsh_gso_segment(), calls\nskb_mac_gso_segment() to invoke inner protocol GSO handlers.\r\n\r\nnsh_gso_segment() does the following for the original skb before\ncalling skb_mac_gso_segment()\r\n\r\n  1. reset skb-\u0026gt;network_header\n  2. save the original skb-\u0026gt;{mac_heaeder,mac_len} in a local variable\n  3. pull the NSH header\n  4. resets skb-\u0026gt;mac_header\n  5. set up skb-\u0026gt;mac_len and skb-\u0026gt;protocol for the inner protocol.\r\n\r\nand does the following for the segmented skb\r\n\r\n  6. set ntohs(ETH_P_NSH) to skb-\u0026gt;protocol\n  7. push the NSH header\n  8. restore skb-\u0026gt;mac_header\n  9. set skb-\u0026gt;mac_header + mac_len to skb-\u0026gt;network_header\n 10. restore skb-\u0026gt;mac_len\r\n\r\nThere are two problems in 6-7 and 8-9.\r\n\r\n  (a)\n  After 6 \u0026amp; 7, skb-\u0026gt;data points to the NSH header, so the outer header\n  (ETH_P_8021AD in this case) is stripped when skb is sent out of netdev.\r\n\r\n  Also, if NSH is encapsulated by NSH + Ethernet (so NSH-Ethernet-NSH),\n  skb_pull() in the first nsh_gso_segment() will make skb-\u0026gt;data point\n  to the middle of the outer NSH or Ethernet header because the Ethernet\n  header is not pulled by the second nsh_gso_segment().\r\n\r\n  (b)\n  While restoring skb-\u0026gt;{mac_header,network_header} in 8 \u0026amp; 9,\n  nsh_gso_segment() does not assume that the data in the linear\n  buffer is shifted.\r\n\r\n  However, udp6_ufo_fragment() could shift the data and change\n  skb-\u0026gt;mac_header accordingly as demonstrated by syzbot.\r\n\r\n  If this happens, even the restored skb-\u0026gt;mac_header points to\n  the middle of the outer header.\r\n\r\nIt seems nsh_gso_segment() has never worked with outer headers so far.\r\n\r\nAt the end of nsh_gso_segment(), the outer header must be restored for\nthe segmented skb, instead of the NSH header.\r\n\r\nTo do that, let\u0026apos;s calculate the outer header position relatively from\nthe inner header and set skb-\u0026gt;{data,mac_header,protocol} properly.\r\n\r\n[0]:\nBUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:524 [inline]\nBUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline]\nBUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xf44/0x16b0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:668\n ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:524 [inline]\n ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline]\n ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xf44/0x16b0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:668\n ipvlan_start_xmit+0x5c/0x1a0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:222\n __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4989 [inline]\n netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5003 [inline]\n xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3547 [inline]\n dev_hard_start_xmit+0x244/0xa10 net/core/dev.c:3563\n __dev_queue_xmit+0x33ed/0x51c0 net/core/dev.c:4351\n dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3171 [inline]\n packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276\n packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline]\n packet_sendmsg+0x8aef/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113\n sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]\n __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]\n __sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191\n __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline]\n __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline]\n __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b\r\n\r\nUninit was created at:\n slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3819 [inline]\n slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline]\n __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3980 [inline]\n __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x705/0x1000 mm/slub.c:4001\n kmalloc_reserve+0x249/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:582\n __\n---truncated---(CVE-2024-36933)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nwifi: ar5523: enable proper endpoint verification\r\n\r\nSyzkaller reports [1] hitting a warning about an endpoint in use\nnot having an expected type to it.\r\n\r\nFix the issue by checking for the existence of all proper\nendpoints with their according types intact.\r\n\r\nSadly, this patch has not been tested on real hardware.\r\n\r\n[1] Syzkaller report:\n------------[ cut here ]------------\nusb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 3 != type 1\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3643 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504 usb_submit_urb+0xed6/0x1880 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504\n...\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n ar5523_cmd+0x41b/0x780 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c:275\n ar5523_cmd_read drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c:302 [inline]\n ar5523_host_available drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c:1376 [inline]\n ar5523_probe+0x14b0/0x1d10 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c:1655\n usb_probe_interface+0x30f/0x7f0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396\n call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:560 [inline]\n really_probe+0x249/0xb90 drivers/base/dd.c:639\n __driver_probe_device+0x1df/0x4d0 drivers/base/dd.c:778\n driver_probe_device+0x4c/0x1a0 drivers/base/dd.c:808\n __device_attach_driver+0x1d4/0x2e0 drivers/base/dd.c:936\n bus_for_each_drv+0x163/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:427\n __device_attach+0x1e4/0x530 drivers/base/dd.c:1008\n bus_probe_device+0x1e8/0x2a0 drivers/base/bus.c:487\n device_add+0xbd9/0x1e90 drivers/base/core.c:3517\n usb_set_configuration+0x101d/0x1900 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2170\n usb_generic_driver_probe+0xbe/0x100 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:238\n usb_probe_device+0xd8/0x2c0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:293\n call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:560 [inline]\n really_probe+0x249/0xb90 drivers/base/dd.c:639\n __driver_probe_device+0x1df/0x4d0 drivers/base/dd.c:778\n driver_probe_device+0x4c/0x1a0 drivers/base/dd.c:808\n __device_attach_driver+0x1d4/0x2e0 drivers/base/dd.c:936\n bus_for_each_drv+0x163/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:427\n __device_attach+0x1e4/0x530 drivers/base/dd.c:1008\n bus_probe_device+0x1e8/0x2a0 drivers/base/bus.c:487\n device_add+0xbd9/0x1e90 drivers/base/core.c:3517\n usb_new_device.cold+0x685/0x10ad drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2573\n hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5353 [inline]\n hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5497 [inline]\n port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5653 [inline]\n hub_event+0x26cb/0x45d0 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5735\n process_one_work+0x9bf/0x1710 kernel/workqueue.c:2289\n worker_thread+0x669/0x1090 kernel/workqueue.c:2436\n kthread+0x2e8/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376\n ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306\n \u0026lt;/TASK\u0026gt;(CVE-2024-38565)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\neth: sungem: remove .ndo_poll_controller to avoid deadlocks\r\n\r\nErhard reports netpoll warnings from sungem:\r\n\r\n  netpoll_send_skb_on_dev(): eth0 enabled interrupts in poll (gem_start_xmit+0x0/0x398)\n  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at net/core/netpoll.c:370 netpoll_send_skb+0x1fc/0x20c\r\n\r\ngem_poll_controller() disables interrupts, which may sleep.\nWe can\u0026apos;t sleep in netpoll, it has interrupts disabled completely.\nStrangely, gem_poll_controller() doesn\u0026apos;t even poll the completions,\nand instead acts as if an interrupt has fired so it just schedules\nNAPI and exits. None of this has been necessary for years, since\nnetpoll invokes NAPI directly.(CVE-2024-38597)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\next4: fix mb_cache_entry\u0026apos;s e_refcnt leak in ext4_xattr_block_cache_find()\r\n\r\nSyzbot reports a warning as follows:\r\n\r\n============================================\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5075 at fs/mbcache.c:419 mb_cache_destroy+0x224/0x290\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 0 PID: 5075 Comm: syz-executor199 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-gb947cc5bf6d7\nRIP: 0010:mb_cache_destroy+0x224/0x290 fs/mbcache.c:419\nCall Trace:\n \u0026lt;TASK\u0026gt;\n ext4_put_super+0x6d4/0xcd0 fs/ext4/super.c:1375\n generic_shutdown_super+0x136/0x2d0 fs/super.c:641\n kill_block_super+0x44/0x90 fs/super.c:1675\n ext4_kill_sb+0x68/0xa0 fs/ext4/super.c:7327\n[...]\n============================================\r\n\r\nThis is because when finding an entry in ext4_xattr_block_cache_find(), if\next4_sb_bread() returns -ENOMEM, the ce\u0026apos;s e_refcnt, which has already grown\nin the __entry_find(), won\u0026apos;t be put away, and eventually trigger the above\nissue in mb_cache_destroy() due to reference count leakage.\r\n\r\nSo call mb_cache_entry_put() on the -ENOMEM error branch as a quick fix.(CVE-2024-39276)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nnetfilter: nf_tables: fully validate NFT_DATA_VALUE on store to data registers\r\n\r\nregister store validation for NFT_DATA_VALUE is conditional, however,\nthe datatype is always either NFT_DATA_VALUE or NFT_DATA_VERDICT. This\nonly requires a new helper function to infer the register type from the\nset datatype so this conditional check can be removed. Otherwise,\npointer to chain object can be leaked through the registers.(CVE-2024-42070)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ncrypto: aead,cipher - zeroize key buffer after use\r\n\r\nI.G 9.7.B for FIPS 140-3 specifies that variables temporarily holding\ncryptographic information should be zeroized once they are no longer\nneeded. Accomplish this by using kfree_sensitive for buffers that\npreviously held the private key.(CVE-2024-42229)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nlibceph: fix race between delayed_work() and ceph_monc_stop()\r\n\r\nThe way the delayed work is handled in ceph_monc_stop() is prone to\nraces with mon_fault() and possibly also finish_hunting().  Both of\nthese can requeue the delayed work which wouldn\u0026apos;t be canceled by any of\nthe following code in case that happens after cancel_delayed_work_sync()\nruns -- __close_session() doesn\u0026apos;t mess with the delayed work in order\nto avoid interfering with the hunting interval logic.  This part was\nmissed in commit b5d91704f53e (\u0026quot;libceph: behave in mon_fault() if\ncur_mon \u0026lt; 0\u0026quot;) and use-after-free can still ensue on monc and objects\nthat hang off of it, with monc-\u0026gt;auth and monc-\u0026gt;monmap being\nparticularly susceptible to quickly being reused.\r\n\r\nTo fix this:\r\n\r\n- clear monc-\u0026gt;cur_mon and monc-\u0026gt;hunting as part of closing the session\n  in ceph_monc_stop()\n- bail from delayed_work() if monc-\u0026gt;cur_mon is cleared, similar to how\n  it\u0026apos;s done in mon_fault() and finish_hunting() (based on monc-\u0026gt;hunting)\n- call cancel_delayed_work_sync() after the session is closed(CVE-2024-42232)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nusb: gadget: configfs: Prevent OOB read/write in usb_string_copy()\r\n\r\nUserspace provided string \u0026apos;s\u0026apos; could trivially have the length zero. Left\nunchecked this will firstly result in an OOB read in the form\n`if (str[0 - 1] == \u0026apos;\\n\u0026apos;) followed closely by an OOB write in the form\n`str[0 - 1] = \u0026apos;\\0\u0026apos;`.\r\n\r\nThere is already a validating check to catch strings that are too long.\nLet\u0026apos;s supply an additional check for invalid strings that are too short.(CVE-2024-42236)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\next4: make sure the first directory block is not a hole\r\n\r\nThe syzbot constructs a directory that has no dirblock but is non-inline,\ni.e. the first directory block is a hole. And no errors are reported when\ncreating files in this directory in the following flow.\r\n\r\n    ext4_mknod\n     ...\n      ext4_add_entry\n        // Read block 0\n        ext4_read_dirblock(dir, block, DIRENT)\n          bh = ext4_bread(NULL, inode, block, 0)\n          if (!bh \u0026amp;\u0026amp; (type == INDEX || type == DIRENT_HTREE))\n          // The first directory block is a hole\n          // But type == DIRENT, so no error is reported.\r\n\r\nAfter that, we get a directory block without \u0026apos;.\u0026apos; and \u0026apos;..\u0026apos; but with a valid\ndentry. This may cause some code that relies on dot or dotdot (such as\nmake_indexed_dir()) to crash.\r\n\r\nTherefore when ext4_read_dirblock() finds that the first directory block\nis a hole report that the filesystem is corrupted and return an error to\navoid loading corrupted data from disk causing something bad.(CVE-2024-42304)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\ndrm/gma500: fix null pointer dereference in cdv_intel_lvds_get_modes\r\n\r\nIn cdv_intel_lvds_get_modes(), the return value of drm_mode_duplicate()\nis assigned to mode, which will lead to a NULL pointer dereference on\nfailure of drm_mode_duplicate(). Add a check to avoid npd.(CVE-2024-42310)\r\n\r\nIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\r\n\r\nbna: adjust \u0026apos;name\u0026apos; buf size of bna_tcb and bna_ccb structures\r\n\r\nTo have enough space to write all possible sprintf() args. Currently\n\u0026apos;name\u0026apos; size is 16, but the first \u0026apos;%s\u0026apos; specifier may already need at\nleast 16 characters, since \u0026apos;bnad-\u0026gt;netdev-\u0026gt;name\u0026apos; is used there.\r\n\r\nFor \u0026apos;%d\u0026apos; specifiers, assume that they require:\n * 1 char for \u0026apos;tx_id + tx_info-\u0026gt;tcb[i]-\u0026gt;id\u0026apos; sum, BNAD_MAX_TXQ_PER_TX is 8\n * 2 chars for \u0026apos;rx_id + rx_info-\u0026gt;rx_ctrl[i].ccb-\u0026gt;id\u0026apos;, BNAD_MAX_RXP_PER_RX\n   is 16\r\n\r\nAnd replace sprintf with snprintf.\r\n\r\nDetected using the static analysis tool - Svace.(CVE-2024-43839)","affected":[{"package":{"ecosystem":"openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP4","name":"kernel","purl":"pkg:rpm/openEuler/kernel\u0026distro=openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4"}]}],"ecosystem_specific":{"aarch64":["bpftool-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm","bpftool-debuginfo-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm","kernel-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm","kernel-debuginfo-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm","kernel-debugsource-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm","kernel-devel-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm","kernel-source-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm","kernel-tools-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm","kernel-tools-debuginfo-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm","kernel-tools-devel-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm","perf-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm","perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm","python2-perf-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm","python2-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm","python3-perf-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm","python3-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm"],"src":["kernel-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.src.rpm"],"x86_64":["bpftool-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm","bpftool-debuginfo-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm","kernel-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm","kernel-debuginfo-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm","kernel-debugsource-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm","kernel-devel-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm","kernel-source-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm","kernel-tools-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm","kernel-tools-debuginfo-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm","kernel-tools-devel-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm","perf-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm","perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm","python2-perf-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm","python2-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm","python3-perf-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm","python3-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2408.4.0.0291.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm"]}}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-2030"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47207"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-26586"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-26598"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-26602"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27013"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36286"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36484"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36904"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36914"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36933"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38565"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38597"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39276"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42070"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42229"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42232"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42236"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42304"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42310"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43839"}],"database_specific":{"severity":"High"}}